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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the 1980s, Las Vegas has successfully redefined itself from mob ca-
sinos to the status of adult entertainment center of the world.' Every year mil-
lions of visitors from all over the world tour the hotels lining the Las Vegas
Boulevard (commonly known as the "Strip"). Tourists are entertained by the
theme-based architectures and live sidewalk shows. However, pedestrians
walking along on the sidewalks, watching pirate shows or water shows, are also
the target of "off-premises canvassers." Off-premises canvassers are persons
hired by merchants to distribute advertising handbills on the public sidewalks
instead of where the businesses are located.2 A majority of these canvassers
distribute graphic advertising of erotic dancers who provide entertainment to
tourists in their hotel rooms, known as "adult outcall entertainment." 3 Because
merchants regard the high volume of pedestrians on the Strip as a captive audi-
ence for this form of cheap advertising,4 the off-premises canvassers hired by
them had increased to perhaps as many as ten to thirty canvassers at any par-
ticular Strip hotel sidewalk by the late 1990s. 5 Fierce competition among the
canvassers led them to line up on both sides of the sidewalk forming gauntlets
or cordons. Pedestrians had to pass through these cordons and were forced to
accept the advertising handbills thrust at them by the canvassers. 6 The aggres-
" The author would like to thank Professors Jay Bybee, Thomas McAffee, and Carl Tobias
who reviewed the paper and made valuable comments.
'See William R. Eadington, Casino Management in the 1990s: Concepts and Challenges, in
CASINO GAMBLING IN AMERICA: ORIGINS, TRENDS, AND IMPACTS 14 (Klaus J. Meyer-
Arendt & Rudi Hartmann eds. 1998).2See Clark County Ordinance 16.12.020 (5)(a) defining "Off-premises canvassing" as dis-
tributing handbills on public sidewalks. See Section III of the paper which discussed the
definition in more details.3See Joint Answering Brief of Appellees, p. 7, S.O.C., Inc. v. County of Clark, 152 F.3d
1136, 1140 (9th Cir. Nev. 1998) (No. 97-15912); see also Order (Case No. CV-S-97-0123-
LDG(RJJ) CV-S-97-0146-LDG(RJJ)) at 3 and 6 (March 4, 1997).4See id. at 7.
5See id. at 9-11; see also Order at 6-7.
6See Order at 7.
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sive nature of the canvassers resulted in intimidation, at times forcing pedestri-
ans into the streets thereby creating potential for injury. The disputes among
the canvassers sometimes required the interference of hotel security and po-
licemen. 7 Furthermore, the large quantity of handbills discarded by pedestrians
caused litter problems.
In response, and primarily to ensure pedestrian safety, Clark County en-
acted Ordinance 16.12 that prohibited off-premises canvassing of commercial
handbills based on a traffic study that found only commercial canvassers caus-
ing these problems.
8
Clark County modeled Ordinance 16.12 after the language of an ordinance
enforced in the city of Key West, Florida.9 Key West, a tourist community, had
problems similar to those experienced by Las Vegas. The Key West ordinance
banned off-premises canvassing on public beaches and required canvassers to
apply permits.' 0 The business people of Key West challenged the Key West
ordinance as violating the First Amendment" of the Constitution. Nevertheless,
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the Key West ordinance in Sciar-
rino v. City of Key West.12
Likewise, two Nevada outcall-service companies challenged the Clark
County Ordinance in S.O.C. v. Clark County. However, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals struck down the Ordinance as unconstitutionally "over-
broad.' 13  The court reasoned that the Ordinance may inhibit expressions of
"fully protected noncommercial speech inextricably intertwined with commer-
cial speech."' 4 The court ruled that although the County may impose reason-
able time, place, and manner restrictions on protected speech in a public forum,
the Ordinance is regulating the commercial content of the speech, thus the con-
tent-based Ordinance is subject to strict scrutiny.' 5
The Ninth Circuit's ruling that the Ordinance was overbroad was based on
71d. at 6.
81d.; see also Clark County Ordinance 16.11.040(e). Based on a traffic study conducted by
the Clark County department of public works according to the methodology set forth in the
Las Vegas Boulevard South Pedestrian Walkway Study. (Ord. 1616 § 1 (part), 1994).
9The City of Key West enacted Ordinance 94.02 which defines off-premises canvassing as
distribution of information or solicitation of customers on publicly-owned property in con-
nection with a business. Business is defined as any commercial activity in which any real
property, goods or services are sold or offered for sale, performance for lease, or for rent.
10See Sciarrino v. City of Key West, 83 F.3d 364, 366 (11t" Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 768 (1997).
"The First Amendment provides, in part, that "Congress shall make no law.., abridging the
freedom of speech..." By the Fourteenth Amendment, this fundamental right is also pro-
tected from invasion by state action. See Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938).
12 83 F.3d 364 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 768 (1997).
13152 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. Nev. 1998), amended by S.O.C., Inc. v. County of Clark,
160 F.3d 541 (9th Cir. Nev. 1998).
'
4 1d.
151d. at 1144-46.
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the Supreme Court's holding in Riley v. National Federation of the Blind.16
However, the S.O.C. Court misapplied Riley by making commercial speech too
easy to become "inextricably" intertwined with fully protected speech. It failed
to reconcile the Court's repeated holdings that commercial communications in-
tertwined with important public issues still constitute commercial speech.'
7
Furthermore, in contrast to the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Sciarrino, the
S.0. C. Court failed to draw the common sense distinction between commercial
and noncommercial speech as dictated by the Supreme Court.' 8 The Ninth Cir-
cuit concluded that the Ordinance was overbroad 19 when the Supreme Court
has repeatedly held that the doctrine of overbreadth does not apply to commer-
cial speech regulations. As a consequence, the Ninth Circuit erred by applying
strict scrutiny to the Ordinance instead of the less restrictive intermediate level
scrutiny that applies to commercial speech regulations.
In Section II this paper discusses the Supreme Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence on commercial speech. It explores the non-application of the
overbreadth doctrine to commercial speech. It also discusses the three levels of
judicial scrutiny applicable to the public forum doctrine and the implication of
the different levels of judicial scrutiny on commercial speech conducted in a
public forum. In Section III the paper analyzes the S.O.C. opinion, and con-
cludes that the Ninth Circuit erred by ruling the Ordinance as overbroad. This
paper proposes a better approach to the problem of regulating commercial
speech in public fora in Section IV.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Commercial Speech Doctrine
The Supreme Court developed the doctrine of commercial speech almost
sixty years ago in Valentine v. Christensen.20 In that seminal case a merchant
attempted to outsmart the New York City ban on off-premises canvassing of
handbills advertising submarine tours. Because New York only allowed the
dissemination of "public interest" handbills, the merchant printed his ad on one
side and public interest issues on the other and argued that both speeches were
"inextricably" attached to the medium. 21 The Court ruled that the distribution
of such handbills still constituted "commercial speech." However, the Court
16487 U.S. 781 (1988).
17 See, e.g., Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 474
(1989).
18 This common sense distinction first appeared in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Vir-
ginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976). See also Sciarrino,
83 F.3d at 367.
"aSee S.O.C., 152 F.3d, 1144.
20316 U.S. 52 (1942).
21 Id. at 53-55.
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also declared that the Constitution imposed no restraint on government's power
to restrict purely commercial advertising in a public forum after it unanimously
upheld the City's ban.22 (The public forum doctrine will be discussed in sub-
section C.) Implicitly, the Court assumed that First Amendment protection only
applied to expressions of public interest and not speech motivated by the eco-
nomic self-interest of the speaker.23 Expressly, the Court decided that "com-
mercial speech merits no First Amendment protection."
24
1. First Amendment Affords Reduced Protection to the Commercial
Speech Doctrine
It was not until 1975 that the Court took a different approach and extended
a less than full constitutional protection to commercial speech.25 The Court
ranked commercial speech as a form of "lower-value" speech compared to the
"high value" of political speech; 26 thus, "the Constitution accords less protec-
tion to commercial speech than other constitutional guaranteed forms of ex-
pression. ''27 The Court also held that commensurate with the subordinate posi-
tion of commercial speech in the scale of First Amendment values, the
government has more leeway and can subject it to "modes of regulation that
might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression."
2 s
2. Commercial Communications Containing Public Issues Still
Constitute Commercial Speech
For the next twenty-five years, the Supreme Court attempted to define
commercial speech in order to distinguish it from noncommercial speech, also
known as pure speech, or fully-protected speech. 29 The Court first defined the
core notion of commercial speech as "speech which does no more than propose
a commercial transaction." 3° However, this core notion does not give clear
guidance on how to classify commercial speech that contains pure speech, such
as the advertising handbill in Christensen. Thus, the Court identified three
common traits to further define commercial speech in Bolger v. Youngs Drug
221d. at 54. The Court did not decided on the "inextricable attached" argument.23Arlen W. Langvardt & Eric L. Richards, The Death of Posadas and the Birth of Change in
commercial Speech Doctrine: Implications of 44 Liquormart, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 482, 486
(1997).24Id.
25Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975) ("The relationship of speech to the market-
place of products or of services does not make it valueless in the marketplace of ideas").26See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978).27See, e.g., Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455-56. Other constitutionally guaranteed speech includes
political, religious, philosophical, ideological, or erotic messages.28See Fox, 492 U.S. at 477 (quoting Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456).
29See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762.30 d.
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Products Corp.3
In Bolger, the Court held that unsolicited mailings of contraceptives adver-
tising to the mass public, which also contained discussions of important public
issues such as family planning, constituted commercial speech.32 It identified
three common traits that when combined provided strong support for a classifi-
cation of commercial speech: use of the advertisement form, a reference to a
specific product, and a motivation solely related to the economic interest of the
advertiser and its audience. Specifically, Bolger concluded that advertisements,
which link a product to important public issues, still constitute commercial
speech and are "not thereby entitled to the constitutional protection afforded
noncommercial speech.
33
Bolger demonstrated the Court's identification of commercial speech inter-
twined with pure speech as commercial speech in its entirety. However, the
Court often faces the reverse situation of pure speech intertwined with com-
mercial activities, such as charitable solicitations. Many non-profit organiza-
tions in the course of proselytizing or propagating their causes would sell prod-
ucts or solicit charitable donations; nevertheless, the Court treats the entire
activity as pure speech. 34 Furthermore, in Riley, the Court has held that com-
mercial speech will become "inextricably intertwined with otherwise fully pro-
tected speech" when the state compelled such commercial speech in a non-
profit organization's donation solicitations.35 Riley invalidated the North Caro-
lina Charitable Solicitations Act that required professional fundraisers to give a
"compelled statement," which must disclose the percentage of donations actu-
ally turned over to charities, before appealing for funds from donors.
36
Riley began its analysis by categorizing the type of speech at issue. 37 It
concluded that solicitation of charitable contributions is protected speech and
not commercial speech. 38 In response to the State's contention that the "com-
pelled statement" was merely commercial speech, the Court held that, if so, it
was "inextricably intertwined with otherwise fully protected speech., 39 Riley
asserts "the lodestars in deciding what level of scrutiny to apply to a compelled
statement must be the nature of speech taken as a whole" and finds the compo-
nent parts of charitable solicitations cannot be separated from the fully pro-
31463 U.S. 60, 66-67, 73-74 (1983).
32 d. at 62 n.4.331d. at 67-68.
34See, e.g., Village of Schaumburg, v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980)
(door to door charitable solicitation is not purely commercial speech); Heffron v. Interna-
tional Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647 (1981)(group soliciting
religious donations in parkgrounds does not lose the protection of First Amendment).
"s487 U.S. 781, 796.361d. at 796, 789.
37Id. at 787.38d. at 788-89 (citing Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632).
391d. at 796.
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tected whole.4 °
A year after Riley was decided, the Supreme Court in Board of Trustees of
State University of New York. v. Fox,4 1 mandated that Riley does not apply to
commercial speech that can be separated from pure speech. In Fox, a state uni-
versity's regulation prohibited a corporation from conducting "Tupperware par-
ties," which also taught home economics during the products presentation, in
campus dormitory rooms. 42 The company and some college students chal-
lenged the university's regulation as violating the First Amendment. Relying
on Riley, they contended that the home economics element of the speech is "in-
extricably intertwined" with commercial speech, "and that the entirety must
therefore be classified as noncommercial. 43  The Court rejected the argu-
ment.
44
More importantly, Fox delineated that the first inquiry for the court is to
determine "whether the principal type of expression at issue is commercial
speech. 45 It found that "Tupperware parties" proposed a commercial transac-
tion and specifically rejected the student's reliance on Riley. Fox held that
"there is nothing whatever 'inextricable' about the noncommercial aspects of
these presentations." 46 Fox demonstrated that the inclusion of home econom-
ics teachings does not convert a Tupperware party into educational speech any
more than "opening sales presentations with a prayer or a Pledge of Allegiance
would convert them into religious or political speech." It reiterated the
Court's holdings that commercial communications even if intertwined with im-
portant public issues do not convert it into pure speech.
In contrast, the commercial speech in Riley is "inextricably" intertwined
with pure speech because the state law compelled such commercial speech.
Fox narrowed the scope of Riley to protecting only government-compelled
commercial speech as inseparable from pure speech.
In sum, to make a common sense distinction between commercial speech
and commercial speech intertwined with pure speech, the court at the outset
must determine "whether the principal type of expression at issue is commer-
cial speech" based on the core notion of whether the expression proposes a
commercial transaction.48 If an activity seeks financial support for public
causes or solicits donations while proselytizing, the entire activity is pure
speech. If a government-compelled commercial statement is included in the
charitable solicitation, then the compelled statement is "inextricably" inter-
40Id
41492 U.S. 469, 474 (1989).
421d. at 472.
43Id. at 474.
"Id.451d. at 473.
46Id. at 474.
471d. at 474-75.
48M. at 473.
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twined with pure speech. However, if the commercial speech merely contains
discussions of public issues, or where the pure speech elements can be sepa-
rated from the commercial speech, the entire speech constitutes commercial
speech.
3. Commercial Speech Is Subject to Intermediate Level of Scrutiny
The Supreme Court's definition of commercial speech, as proposing a
commercial transaction, could exclude a great deal of modem day advertising
such as "Just Do It" which does not propose to consumers to buy any Nike
products.49 It can also include political speech that essentially says "vote for
me and I will lower your taxes. ' 5  This definition also excludes some com-
mercial speech that is "inextricably" intertwined with fully protected speech as
in Riley's donation solicitations. 51 Finally, it can include communications that
constitute commercial speech notwithstanding the fact that they contain impor-
tant public issues as the handbill in Chrestensen, the mailings in Bolger, or the
home economics teachings in Fox.
These overinclusive, or underinclusive problems demonstrate the difficul-
ties of the Court's attempts with the definition of commercial speech. The
Court finally narrowed the definition to "proposing a commercial transaction"
in Fox and to rely on the distinction between commercial and noncommercial
speech as a matter of "common sense distinction. ' '52 Nevertheless, to help the
federal courts to determine whether a commercial speech regulation violates the
First Amendment, in the landmark case of Central Hudson Gas & Electricity
Corp. v. Public Service Commission,53 the Court established a four-prong,
intermediate-level scrutiny test.
54
The first prong determines whether the commercial speech is within the
ambit of First Amendment protection. To be protected, the commercial speech
"must concern lawful activity and not be misleading., 55 The second prong asks
whether the asserted government interest is substantial. If the answers are yes
to these two questions, then the government must show that the restriction on
commercial speech is "no more broad than necessary" to serve its substantial
interest.56 The Supreme Court later interpreted "no more broad than neces-
49
JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1066 (5' Ed.
1995).
50 d.
s'487 U.S. at 796.
"
2See 492 U.S. at 473. The common sense distinction first appeared in Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748, 772 n. 24.
53447 U.S. 557 (1980).
54d. at 566, 573 (Justice Blackmun concurring opinion stating that commercial speech is
subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny).
5
'1d. at 566.
6Id.
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sary" to mean a "reasonable fit"5 7 between the ends and the means when the
government is regulating the "commercial content" of the expression. 8
In comparison to the level of scrutiny applied to pure speech, the First
Amendment prohibits restrictions based on the content of the message in most
other contexts.59 A regulation limiting pure speech based on its content is sub-
ject to strict scrutiny and must adopt the "least restrictive means" to advance a
compelling state interest.6 ° But strict scrutiny does not apply to commercial
speech even though the government is regulating the "commercial content" of
the speech.6'
4. Commercial Speech meets the Overbreadth Doctrine
The Supreme Court has repeatedly and explicitly stated that the First
Amendment overbreadth doctrine does not apply to commercial speech .62 The
overbreadth doctrine permits a party whose conduct is not constitutionally pro-
tected to raise the constitutional rights of third parties not before the court.63 If
the challenger can show that a number of applications of the regulation as ap-
plied against third parties will be unconstitutional, the overbreadth facial chal-
lenge may succeed. Once the challenger succeeds, even if the regulation is oth-
erwise valid, the state can no longer enforce it against any party. 64
Consequently, the regulation would be invalidated as overbroad.
The overbreadth doctrine's principal purpose is to protect third parties
"who might fear prosecution under an overbroad statute, from self-censoring or
'chilling' protected speech. ,65 However, the Court understands that restrictions
on commercial speech will not have the same "chilling" effect as restrictions on
pure speech. Central Hudson specified that two features of commercial speech
permitted the government to regulate its content without being subject to strict
scrutiny or the overbreadth doctrine:
First, commercial speakers have extensive knowledge of both the market and
57See Fox, 492 U.S. at 480. The reasonable fit between means and ends of commercial
speech regulations is reiterated in City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.,507 U.S.
410, 426 (1993).58The Supreme Court's distinction of content-based and content-neutral regulations presents
many analytical difficulties and complexities. For a detailed discussion on this issue, see
Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction ill First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV.
113. (1981).59 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 n.6.60See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988).
61See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 65 (quoting Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979) (content based
restrictions on commercial speech may be permissible)).62Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 390 (1977).
63Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial Challenges and the Valid Rule Re-
quirement, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 359, 369 (1998); citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747,
768-69 (1982).
64Id. at 371.651d. at 369.
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their products. Thus they are well situated to evaluate the accuracy of their
messages and the lawfulness of the underlying activity. In addition, commer-
cial speech, the offspring of economic self-interest, is a hardy breed of expres-
sion that is not "particularly susceptible to being crushed by overbroad regula-
tion." (Internal citation omitted.)
66
The Court explained that where the expression is linked to commercial
self-interest, it is not easily deterred by overbroad regulations because the
speaker will find other alternatives to disseminate the commercial informa-
67tion. Moreover, the Court described the overbreadth doctrine as "strong
medicine. ' 68 It should be employed sparingly and as a last resort only when
there is "a realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise
the recognized First Amendment protection of third parties."
69
To summarize, several principles emerge from the Supreme Court's juris-
prudence on commercial speech. First, commercial speech is afforded less
constitutional protection than non-commercial speech. Second, even though a
law is regulating the "commercial content" of speech, it is only subject to in-
termediate scrutiny under the Central Hudson test.70 Third, the overbreadth
doctrine does not apply to commercial speech regulations in general. Fourth,
when categorizing commercial speech or pure speech, the first question a court
must determine is whether the principal type of expression at issue is commer-
cial speech or pure speech. Such a determination should be based on common
sense distinction, the three common traits of commercial speech, and the defini-
tion of "proposing a commercial transaction." Fifth, under Riley, only state-
compelled commercial speech will become "inextricably" intertwined with oth-
erwise protected speech. Finally, communications constitute commercial
speech notwithstanding the fact they may contain important public issues under
Fox, Bolger, and Christensen. These principles should guide the lower courts'
determination of the constitutionality of regulations restricting commercial
speech conducted in the public forum.
B. The Public Forum Doctrine
1. The Court Has Divided the Public Forum Doctrine into Three
Categories
The Supreme Court has established that certain public places are protected
by the Constitution in trust for people to exercise their First Amendment
66Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 n.6 (citing Bates v. State Bar of Arizona 433 U.S. 350,
390 (1977)). See also Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial Challenges and the
Valid Rule Requirement, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 359, 369 (1998).67See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 n.8.
nSBates, 433 U.S. at 381.
691d.; see also City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 801 (1984).7 0Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563-64.
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rights.71 The Supreme Court formalized three categories of properties under
the public forum doctrine in Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Edu-
cators' Association.72 The first category is the traditional public forum. It en-
compasses public places, such as parks and public sidewalks, because histori-
cally people used such places to disseminate information and opinion.73 The
second category is the designated public forum, or limited purpose forum,
which consists of facilities the state has intentionally opened to the public for
expressive activities, such as university meeting halls.74 The third category of
property is a nonpublic forum, such as jails, military bases, and airport termi-
nals.75
After it delineated the three categories of public fora, the Supreme Court
applied the level of judicial scrutiny based on whether the government regula-
tion was content-neutral or content-based. Government's content-based or
viewpoint regulations restricting the use of the first two categories of public
76fora are subject to strict scrutiny. "For example, a law regulating 'commu-
nist' publications must be subject to strict scrutiny" because the government
has no power to restrict expression based on its message, its ideas, its subject
matter, or its content under the First Amendment. 77 Government may enforce
such restrictions only if it can show that the regulation "is necessary to serve a
compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.",
78
However, if the government regulation is content-neutral, it is subject to an
intermediate level of scrutiny. The Supreme Court has held that "the First
Amendment does not guarantee the right to communicate one's views at all
times and places or in any manner that may be desired. 7 9  In Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, the Court held that even in a public forum the government may
impose "reasonable restrictions" on time, place, or manner of protected speech
71Michael J. Mellis, Modifications to the Traditional Public forum Doctrine: United States
v. Kokinda and Its Aftermath, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 167, 169-70,(1991)(explaining
Justice Robert's opinion in Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939), as the origin of the public
forum doctrine).
72460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983).
7 See id. at 45.74 See Mellis, supra note 71, at 171 (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) and
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1985)).75See Stephen K. Schutte, International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee: The
Public Forum Doctrine Falls to Government Intent Standard, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.
563, 579, 586 (1993). One of the two significant principles of Lee is that publicly-owned
airport terminals are nonpublic fora and government regulations are only subject to rational
basis analysis.76See Mellis, supra note 71, at 170-71 (The non-public forum regulations are only subject to
rational basis review).
77See Ofer Raban, Content-Based, Secondary Effects, And Expressive Conduct: What In The
World Do They Mean (and What Do They Mean to the United States Supreme Court)?, 30
SETON HALL L. REV. 551-53(2000)(quoting the basic idea of content-based/content-neutral
regulation formulated in Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)).781d.
79Heffron, 452 U.S. at 647 (citations omitted).
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(TPM regulations). 80 Ward specified that so long as the TPM regulations do
not refer to the contents of the speech, leave open alternative channels of com-
munication, they need not adopt the least restrictive means to promote the gov-
ernment's substantial interest.81 In short, if the TPM regulation is "content neu-
tral" and the government's substantial interest is only to cure some evil, such as
noise, that may implicate free speech in the public forum, it is only subject to
intermediate scrutiny, the same level of judicial scrutiny applied to commercial
speech.
Hence, pursuant to Ward and Central Hudson, intermediate scrutiny ap-
plies to the content-neutral TPM regulations and the content-based commercial
speech regulations. Fox endorsed this conclusion by stating that the test for
commercial speech is "substantially similar to" the TPM regulations on pro-
tected speech in public forum.83 However, commercial speech regulations are
never content-neutral TPM regulations as the Court has ruled in City of Cincin-
nati v. Discovery Network, Inc.84 Indeed, sharing the same level of scrutiny is
where the similarity between the two doctrines ends.
2. Commercial Speech Meets the Public Forum Doctrine
The public forum doctrine is distinct from the commercial speech doctrine.
When the two doctrines converge, the Court would first examine the nature of
the speech in its entirety, then apply the appropriate level of scrutiny to gov-
ernment restrictions.85 There are three possible outcomes under the Court's
analysis.
First, as in Fox, the Court may determine the primary activity as commer-
cial speech if it proposes a commercial transaction and the noncommercial
messages are separable from the commercial communications. The Hudson
test that applies intermediate-level scrutiny validates the constitutionality of the
regulation, but the public forum doctrine is subsumed in the Central Hudson
°491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
81 d. at 798-800 (narrowly tailored does not require the government to adopt the least restric-
tive means).
821d. at 796 (cited cases that used "substantial" and "significant" state interest interchangea-
bly); Id. at 798-99 n.6 (the Court never applied strict scrutiny to TPM regulations).
8'492 U.S. at 477 (the test for the TPM regulation does not require least restrictive means).
84See 507 U.S. 410, 429 (1993)(government regulation to ban the use of newsracks that dis-
tribute commercial handbills is based on the different content between ordinary newspapers
and commercial speech; thus, the ban is "content based").85See Mellis, supra note 71, at 170-72, 195 (citing e.g., Heffron v. International Society for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981)(parks and religious solicitation)). The
public forum cases, or the progeny of Perry, are all cases involving religious, political, or
other ideological expressions that are intertwined with religious solicitation, charity dona-
tion, political advertising, or picketing in the public forum. The Court treated all these cases
as a restriction on fully protected speech and not commercial speech cases. In Riley, the
Court reiterated that charitable solicitations are not commercial speech but fully protected
speech.
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test or ignored. For example, the "Tupperware party" conducted in school
dormitories should be categorized as a non-public forum under Perry because
the university did not open the dormitory to the public for expressive activity.
Thus, rational-based scrutiny should apply; nevertheless, the Fox Court still ap-
plied intermediate level scrutiny and analyzed the prohibition under the Central
Hudson Test.
86
Second, the Court may decide that the primary activity, such as proselytiz-
ing combined with selling products or solicitation donations, is fully-protected
speech. If the Court decides that the primary activity is pure speech, govern-
ment regulation restricting such activity is subject to the public forum doctrine.
The Court then determines whether the communication takes place in a tradi-
tional, designated, or nonpublic forum.87 If the communication takes place in
the traditional or the designated forum, the Court examines whether the regula-
tion is content-based or content-neutral. A content-based regulation is subject
to strict scrutiny. In contrast, a content-neutral TPM regulation is subject to in-
termediate-level scrutiny. If the communication takes place in a non-public fo-
rum, the Court only applies rational basis scrutiny to the regulation be it con-
tent-based or content-neutral.88
Finally, the distinction between commercial speech and pure speech may
be a close question; for example, a newspaper that contains commercials and
advertisements that contain public issues. In such a situation, the Court will
assume the regulation as a commercial speech regulation and apply the Central
Hudson test as in Discovery Network
8 9
The relationship between these two doctrines, the overinclusive and under-
inclusive definition of the commercial speech, and the "common-sense distinc-
tion" requirement of commercial speech have created conflicting holdings in
the circuit courts. At one end of the spectrum, when the government is restrict-
ing only commercial speech conducted in the public forum, the federal courts
can apply intermediate scrutiny to the regulation because the government can
regulate the commercial content of speech, as the Eleventh Circuit held in Sci-
arrino. At the other end, the federal courts can apply strict scrutiny by making
commercial speech "inextricably" intertwined with fully protected-speech so
easily that the whole speech becomes the latter and thus demand full First
Amendment protection, as the Ninth Circuit ruled in S. O. C.
86See 492 U.S. at 472; See also Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 429. The ban on commer-
cial newracks on sidewalks is a content-based regulation in a public or designated fora, thus
strict scrutiny should apply to the city's ban. But the Court still applied Hudson's intermedi-
ate level scrutiny.
87See Schutte, supra note 75, at 571 (citing Justice Reqhnquist opinion in Lee).
8 8See Mellis, supra note 71, at 174-77 (citing United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720
(1990)(postal office sidewalks are not public forum, thus rational basis scrutiny applies to
regulation on political solicitations on such sidewalks)).
89507 U.S. at 424 and n.19.
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III. ANALYSIS
A. Facts of S.O.C., Inc. v. County of Clark
The plaintiffs, S.O.C. Inc. and Hillsboro Enterprises, Inc., are companies
that provide exotic dance services to tourists and convention attendees in their
hotel rooms, known as adult outcall entertainment. 90 They regularly hired can-
vassers to distribute leaflets that advertised such adult outcall entertainment in
public streets and sidewalks in areas surrounding the Las Vegas "Strip" and the
Las Vegas Convention Center (collectively the "Resort District").9' Plaintiffs
filed suits challenging the constitutionality of Ordinance 16.12 (Ordinance),
which prohibited off-premises canvassing within the Las Vegas Resort District.
The American Civil Liberties Union of Nevada (ACLU) intervened.
ACLU raised a facial overbreadth challenge to the Ordinance, contending that
the Ordinance was facially unconstitutional because it regulated not only com-
mercial speech but also "fully protected noncommercial speech 'inextricably
intertwined' with commercial speech.
9 2
The plaintiffs named Clark County (County) and the Las Vegas Metropoli-
tan Police Department as the defendants. The Nevada Resort Association,
Flamingo Hilton, Mirage Casino-Hotel, and Circus Circus Enterprises also in-
tervened as defendants. 93 The defendants cited the Eleventh Circuit's decision
in Sciarrino to support the validity of the Ordinance. 94
The Nevada District Court held a one-day evidentiary hearing and, based
on affidavits, photographs, and videos, found that the County satisfied the four-
part test outlined in Central Hudson.95 First, assuming the plaintiffs are in-
volved in legal commercial activities and non-misleading advertising, the court
found that the County had "substantial" interest in preventing the real harm
caused by canvassers. 96 The district court found that the canvassers vying for
strategic locations slowed pedestrian traffic and their harassing activities re-
sulted in fights that sometimes required the intervention of hotel security or
Clark County police. 97 Thus, the harm is real and substantial. Second, because
9°See Order at 3.
91S.O.C., 152 F.3d at 1140.
921d. at 1143.
931d. at 1141.94See S.O.C., 160 F.3d at 542. In Sciarrino, the court held that the Florida city ordinance
prohibiting off-remises commercial solicitation in tourist centers as valid under the First
Amendment because the canvassers impeded free access to public roads, harassed pedestri-
ans, and increased littering.
95See Order at 3-4.
96See Ordinance 16.12.040 which exempts the distribution of leaflets placed in authorized
newsracks and stated that the purposes in passing Ordinance 16.12 were: (1) to improve the
pedestrian environment; (2) to maintain accessible sidewalks (3) to prevent harassment of
pedestrians; and (4) to reduce litter.
97See Order, at 6.
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the Ordinance exempted newsracks, taxi-cab billboards, and other locations in
the Resort District, the Ordinance left open alternative channels of communica-
tion. Thus, the Ordinance was a "reasonable" restriction that "directly" ad-
vanced the County's interest to prevent harassment of pedestrians, and to re-
duce congestion and litter.98 The district court denied the plaintiff's request for
a preliminary injunction.99 The plaintiffs and the ACLU appealed.
The Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision, holding that the
civil liberties organization demonstrated probable success on the merits of its
claim that the restrictions imposed by Clark County Ordinance Section 16.12
were overbroad.' 00 Unlike the Key West regulation which the Eleventh Circuit
determined reached no further than purely commercial speech,' °' the Clark
County Ordinance was held to "reach both pure commercial speech and non-
commercial speech inextricably intertwined with commercial speech.' 1 2  In
addition, the Court of Appeals held that the Clark County Ordinance not only
imposed more extensive restrictions than the Key West Ordinance, but also
lacked several of the narrowly-tailored features included in the Key West Ordi-
nance.1
03
B. Failure to follow Board of Trustees, State Univ. of N. Y v. Fox and Bolger
v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.
The S.O.C. Court erred in its determination that the Ordinance is not a
commercial speech regulation from the outset." 4  It failed to apply the Su-
preme Court's "common-sense distinction" approach to commercial speech.
Instead the Ninth Circuit approached the Gordian knot of commercial speech,
commercial speech intertwined with pure speech, and commercial speech "in-
extricably" intertwined with pure speech by cutting commercial speech right at
the knee in applying the overbreadth doctrine and, therefore, strict scrutiny to
strike down the Ordinance.
The S.O.C. Court failed to follow the Fox dictate, which provided that
when categorizing the type of speech at issue, "the first question" a court con-
fronts is whether the principle type of expression is commercial speech.'0 5 The
S. 0. C. Court concluded the Ordinance as overbroad without discussing why the
principal type of expression of the handbills was not commercial communica-
tions subject to the Hudson test.'06 Instead, it started by examining whether the
communications regulated by the Ordinance were accorded "full protection"
"Id. at 11-14.
99See id. at 16-17.
l'°S.O.C. 160 F.3d 541.
'
0 1Sciarrino, 83 F.3d 363, 366.
"' S.O.C., 160 F.3d 541.
103 id.
'
14See S.O.C., 152 F.3d at 1140.
'"See, Fox, 492 U.S. at 473.
106See S.O.C., 152 F.3d at 1143-44.
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under the First Amendment. 0 7 It ruled the Ordinance was overbroad because it
would be likely to restrict pure speech "inextricably" intertwined with commer-
cial speech.
108
Handbills of outcall girls provide a classic example of a case where a court
can easily make a "common sense distinction" as the handbills do not contain
any public, religious, or political issues, or charitable solicitations. Even if the
handbills contain all of those important messages, the handbills are still com-
mercial speech. As dictated by Fox and Bolger, commercial communications
"constitute commercial speech notwithstanding the fact that they contain dis-
cussions of important public issues."
10 9
Furthermore, the Ordinance is regulating only commercial expressions by
adopting the language of Bolger and Fox. However, the S. 0. C. Court ruled that
the language of the Ordinance was not limited and lacked exemptions even
though it tracked the language of Bolger. 110 Bolger identified the three com-
mon traits that when combined would characterize commercial speech: use of
the advertisement form, a reference to a specific product, and a motivation
solely related to the economic interest of the advertiser and its audience.'11 Fox
identified the test for commercial speech even more narrowly as "proposing of
a commercial transaction." 12 The Ordinance incorporated the three factors of
Bolger and Fox, and defined "off-premises canvassing" as:
distributing, handing out, or offering on public sidewalks, handbills, leaflets,
brochures, pamphlets or other printed or written literature, materials, or infor-
mation, which advertise or promote services or goods for sale lease or rent or
which otherwise propose one or more commercial transactions and which spe-
cifically refer to products or services for sale, lease or rent and which are dis-
tributed with an economic motivation or commercial gain; or (b) soliciting on
public sidewalks, pedestrians to purchase, lease, or rent services or goods or
otherwise propose one or more commercial transactions. C.C.C. §
16.12.020(5) (emphasis added).
The S. 0. C. Court acknowledged that the Ordinance tracked the language of
Bolger; but it held that it did not use "any limiting language such as 'solely,'
'exclusively,' or 'primarily'."'1 3 It asserted that the phrase "or otherwise pro-
pose one or more commercial transaction" in the Ordinance was not the same
as "propose no more than a commercial transaction."'1 14 The S. 0. C. Court did
not explain why adding the words solely, exclusively, or primarily, will exon-
erate the Ordinance from being "overbroad" or escape the courts conclusion
that the Ordinance is likely to regulate pure speech "inextricably" intertwined
'
71d. at 1142.
'
08 d. at 1143.
"See Fox, 492 U.S. at 475.
110152 F.3d at 1144.
11463 U.S. at 66-67.
"'Fox, 492 U.S at 475; see also Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 423.
"
3S.O.C., 152 F.3d at 1143-44.
'
41d. at 1144.
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with commercial speech.' 15
Moreover, the Fox's test for identifying commercial speech as "proposing
of a commercial transaction" is overinclusive and underinclusive. No one
would dispute that a Nike commercial that does not propose any commercial
transaction is still commercial speech; or, a car dealer proposing more than one
commercial transaction, such as selling the car, the warranty, and financing of
the car, is not commercial speech. The S.O.C. Court's assertion that the phrase
"or otherwise propose one or more commercial transaction" in the Ordinance
was not the same as "propose no more than a commercial transaction" is too
vague to give clear guidance to Clark County and the district courts.
After the S.O.C. Court failed to draw the common sense distinction be-
tween commercial speech and noncommercial speech, it then misapplied Riley
to conclude the Ordinance as likely to regulate pure speech "inextricably" inter-
twined with commercial speech.
C. Misapplication of Riley v. National Federation of the Blind
The S.0. C. Court failed to reconcile Riley with Fox by making commercial
speech too easy to become "inextricably" intertwined with pure speech. The
court never explained why pure speech, even if intertwined with the outcall-girl
handbills (commercial component), cannot be extricated from the latter. Mis-
applying Riley, the court held that the Ordinance could have regulated speech
that may potentially be intertwined with commercial speech and must be
treated as regulating pure speech. The court erred in equating "could" be inter-
twined with commercial speech as the same as "inextricably" intertwined with
pure speech.1
16
Riley involved charitable solicitation, which is pure speech." 7 The Su-
preme Court found the commercial speech is "inextricably" intertwined with
pure speech because the state compelled the commercial statement.'118 In
S.O.C., Las Vegas has not compelled any speech on the canvassers, and the
canvassers are handing out advertising of outcall girls without any charitable
solicitation. Clearly, Riley's conditions of charitable solicitation and state-
compelled speech are not met under the facts of S. O. C. Even if the canvassers
are conducting charitable solicitation while handing out advertising of outcall
girls, under Fox, such solicitation can easily be separated from the commercial
communication and the whole activity should be deemed commercial speech.
It should never be categorized as commercial speech "inextricably" intertwined
with pure speech as the S.0. C. Court has done. The court erred in its overbroad
application of Riley.
"
51d. at 1140.
1161d.
117See 487 U.S. at 788.
"
8See id. at 796.
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D. Misapplication of the Overbreadth Doctrine
The S.O.C. Court accepted ACLU's facially overboard challenge
and denied the Ordinance the status of a commercial speech regulation. Con-
sequently, the circuit court can circumvent the Supreme Court's mandate
that the overbreadth doctrine does not apply to commercial speech
regulations. The Court has emphasized that the overbreadth doctrine
is strong medicine and should not be applied to commercial speech
unless it poses as a "realistic danger" of smothering fully protected speech." 9
The Court also explained that commercial speech will not be
"crushed" by overbroad regulations because economic self-interest
will motivate the speech to find other channels of expression. 2 °
The Ordinance does not pose as a "realistic danger" that will significantly
compromise the First Amendment protection of people who solicit donations,
sell products for public causes on the Strip, or canvassers giving out handbills
and proselytizing. Many alternative channels of advertising are available to the
outcall businesses. For example, Clark County allows outcall-service adver-
tisements in telephone book yellow pages, taxi-cab billboards, at certain con-
ventions held in Las Vegas, and in any other area outside the Strip.
121
Furthermore, the S.O.C. Court can provide only one application of the Or-
dinance against third parties that would be unconstitutionally overbroad. The
court stated that the Ordinance would sweep in a newspaper or a magazine that
stressed social, religious, political, or environmental issues but also contained
some advertisements.'22
However, in Discovery Network, the Supreme Court held that regardless of
the difficulty in defining the distinction between a "newspaper" and a "com-
mercial handbill," it would assume that all of the speech barred by the city's
regulation was commercial speech. 123 In contrast, the S. 0.C. Court allowed the
overbreadth doctrine in to strike down the Ordinance as invalid "on its face"
even though it tracked the language of Bolger and Fox, and would not pose a
"realistic danger" of inhibiting the constitutionally protected speech of third
parties. 124  After declaring the Ordinance as facially overbroad, the court ap-plied the public forum doctrine and strict scrutiny to invalidate the Ordinance.
E. Failure to Follow Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.
Once the S.O.C. Court ruled the Ordinance as an overbroad pure speech
regulation, a priori, it ruled the Ordinance was not a content-neutral TPM regu-
S9see, e.g., Bates, 433 U.S. at 390.
'"Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 n.6 (citing Bates, 433 U.S. at 350, 390).
12'See Order at 13-14.
122SeeS.O.C., 152 F.3d at 1144.
123City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S.410 at 422-24 & n.19.
124See Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844, 853-858
(1970).
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lation.125 Since the Ordinance is banning the commercial-content of the hand-
bills, the court correctly ruled that it is not a content-neutral TPM regulation.'
26
However, because the court's premise that the Ordinance is a pure speech regu-
lation is incorrect, its deduction that the Ordinance is not a TPM regulation, al-
though correct, leads the court to apply strict scrutiny to a commercial speech
ordinance. 127 A Commercial speech regulation inherently is never content-
neutral since it is restricting the commercial-content of the speech as explained
in Discovery Network.128 However, the Court's commercial speech jurispru-
dence allows governments to regulate the commercial-content of speech where
such restrictions would be impermissible under pure speech.'
29
The court also ignored the Supreme Court's practice of analyzing commer-
cial speech without applying the public forum doctrine. In Discovery Network,
the Court held that regardless of the difficulty in distinguishing a "newspaper"
containing advertisements from a "commercial handbill" containing public is-
sues involving sidewalks, it would apply the intermediate scrutiny of the Cen-
tral Hudson test.' Here, the S.O.C. Court is also faced with the difficulty of
distinguishing newspaper intertwined with commercial on sidewalks. Never-
theless, it failed to follow Discovery Network and found the Ordinance as a
regulation of speech subject to strict scrutiny.
Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit seems to encourage a total ban of any first
Amendment activities in a traditional public forum. In One World One Family
Now v. City and County of Honolulu, the Ninth Circuit upheld the city's ordi-
nance that flatly banned the sale of merchandise on public streets, sidewalks,
malls, beaches and other public places in Waikiki.' 3
The court held that the flat ban was a TPM regulation that was content neu-
tral even "as applied" to the plaintiff, a non-profit organization that sold mer-
chandise to communicate its philosophical and inspirational views.' 32 Review-
ing the judicially illogical results of the decisions of S.O.C. and One World,
clearly, the Ninth Circuit favors a flat ban on busy tourist streets rather than try-
ing to make a common sense distinction of commercial and non-commercial
regulations.
12 5S.0.C., 152 F.3d at 1144.
'I61d. at 1145.
'
271d. at 114628See Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 429 (government regulation to ban the use of news-
racks that distribute commercial handbills is based on the different content between ordinary
newspapers and commercial speech; thus, the ban is "content based.")
129See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 65 (quoting Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979) (content based
restrictions on commercial speech may be permissible)).
130507 U.S. at 422-24 & n.19.
"'176 F.3d 1009, 1011 (1996).
1321d. at 1012.
Spring 2001 ]
NEVADA LA W JOURNAL
F. Implications of S. 0. C. Court's Ruling
The S.O.C. Court's ruling contradicted the Supreme Court's principles of
commercial speech doctrine. First, its misapplication of Riley destroyed the
different level of protection afforded to commercial speech and non-
commercial speech as dictated by Fox. It violated the concept that speech of
lesser value is only afforded less protection under the First Amendment juris-
prudence. 133 Second, when a government regulates the commercial-content of
speech, it is only subject to intermediate level of scrutiny and not strict scrutiny
even in the context of public forum.
1. Violation of the First Principle
The S.O.C. Court, by a leveling process, destroyed twenty-five years of the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence that commercial speech is given less protection
than non-commercial speech. It ignored the Supreme Court's holding in Bolger
that "communications can constitute commercial speech notwithstanding the
fact that they contain discussions of important public issues. . 134 It also ig-
nored the Fox mandate that, absent government compelled commercial speech,
Riley does not apply to commercial speech even if it could be unnecessarily in-
tertwined with pure speech.
The S.O.C. Court read too broadly the Riley holding as mandating that
commercial speech, which may "potentially" be combined with protected-
speech, should automatically be deemed as fully protected-speech. Based on
the S.O.C. Court's logic, all commercial speech that can be "unnecessarily"
combined with pure speech qualify as the latter and demand full protection. If
this reading is correct, then, commercial speech can easily be maneuvered to
become non-commercial speech and have full protection instead of lesser pro-
tection.
Furthermore, the S.O.C. Court's interpretation of Riley is specifically re-
jected in Fox where the Supreme Court reiterated Bolger and Central Hudson
that "advertising which links a product to a current public debate is not thereby
entitled to the constitutional protection afforded noncommercial speech."'
135
Fox emphasized that to require a parity of constitutional protection for com-
mercial and non-commercial speech alike would dilute the force of First
Amendment's guarantee with respect to the latter.1
36
Clearly, the S.O.C. decision violated the Supreme Court's First Amend-
ment jurisprudence that commercial speech is afforded lesser protection than
noncommercial speech.
133See, e.g., Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455-56.
134463 U.S. 67-68.
1351d. at 475 (quoting Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562-63, n.5).
1361d. at 481.
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2. Violation of the Second Principle
The S.O.C. Court's reading of Riley is contrary to the Supreme Court's
principle that expressions of lesser values are only subject to intermediate scru-
tiny and can be regulated to an extent to which political speech could not.
137
Under the S.O.C. Court's reading of Riley, a government regulating pure
commercial speech would always be subject to strict scrutiny. Under its reason-
ing, since the commercial speech regulation could easily become "inextricably"
intertwined with some element of noncommercial speech, it must then be
deemed in its entirety as the latter. Consequently, the commercial speech regu-
lation becomes a content-based regulation and must be subject to strict scrutiny,
which is almost always fatal.
Moreover, under the court's rationale, if the communications are conducted
in a public forum, any commercial speech regulation would not be a content-
neutral TPM regulation. Again, it could become "inextricably" intertwined with
some element of noncommercial speech and thus violating a third party's First
Amendment rights and must be deemed in its entirety as pure speech. Such
easy intertwining with pure speech, yet never extricating from the commercial
speech contradicts the Supreme Court's commercial speech jurisprudence,
which mandates that commercial speech is subject to only intermediate scrutiny
due to its economic motivations.
Without a doubt, a handbill advertising adult outcall entertainment need
not be intertwined with political, religious, environmental, or other ideological
messages. Nothing in the nature of these ideological messages requires them to
be combined with adult outcall entertainment advertisements. Even if they are
combined with the graphic handbills, they do not convert the handbills into
pure speech. Thus, striking the appropriately worded Ordnance as not regulat-
ing commercial speech simply because it lacked words such as "solely, primar-
ily or exclusively," the S.O.C. Court rewrote Riley, Fox, and Bolger. More-
over, it does not explain why adding such words would distinguish pure
commercial speech regulations from regulations that may restrict pure speech
"inextricably" intertwined with commercial speech.
The consequences of the S.O.C. Court's decision were that the County is
without guidance with respect to how to draft regulations on commercial
speech. It denied the government its sovereign right to protect the safety of pe-
destrians on the congested sidewalks of the Resort District. Moreover, the dis-
trict courts cannot rely on Central Hudson, Bolger, or Fox, to review commer-
cial speech regulations even in preliminary injunction hearings.
IV. A BETTER SOLUTION
The S. 0. C. Court could have determined that the Ordinance was a regula-
tion of commercial speech and still rule it as not a "reasonable" restrictive
'
37Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 n.6.
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means to advance the County's legitimate interest in pedestrian safety by fol-
lowing the Supreme Court's holding in City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Net-
work, Inc. 138 In Discovery Network, the city's municipal code (Code) prohib-
ited the distribution of commercial handbill through 62 newsracks located on
public property while allowing newspapers to be distributed in about 1,500-
2,000 newsracks. 139
The Code defined commercial handbills as printed material that advertised
things for sale or promoted interest in any business establishment.140 Justice
Stevens, writing for the majority, criticized the Code's definition of a commer-
cial handbill as blurring the narrow definition of commercial speech in Bolger
and Fox, thus making the already hard to define distinction between a "news-
paper" and a "commercial handbill" even less clear. 141
Nonetheless, for the purpose of deciding the case, the Supreme Court as-
sumed that all of the speech barred by the Code was commercial speech. 142 It
found the city's purported interest for removing the 62 commercial newsracks
was in protecting the attractive appearance of its streets, rather than any harm
associated with the newsracks, but nevertheless qualified as a substantial state
interest.143 However, it concluded that removing 62 newsracks achieved only a
marginal degree of the city's interest in the visual blight since the city still has
to contend with over 1500-2000 newsracks on its streets.144 Thus, because the
distinction between commercial handbills and newspapers had absolutely no
bearing on the city's interests in esthetics, the Court held that the city's chosen
means to advance its esthetic interest was not reasonable.1
45
The S. 0. C. Court should have followed Discovery Network and assumed
for the purpose of deciding this case that Ordinance 16.12 was regulating
commercial speech. It can then remand the case back for further determination
as to the "reasonable fit" between the County's interest and the chosen means.
The S.O.C. Court could even have applied its own findings that no evidence
supported the conclusion that commercial canvassers were more aggressive in
harassing pedestrians than noncommercial canvassers. 146 It could then have
determined that there was not enough evidence to support the idea that the solu-
tion effectively addressed the problem.
Another solution is to follow the rationale in Sciarrino. In Sciarrino, the
city elicited the testimony of various witnesses to establish the frequency of
harassment of pedestrians; for example, the chamber of commerce office re-
138507 U.S. at 428-29.
"
91d. at 412
14
'Id. at 414.
1411d. at 422-23 & n. 19.
1421d. at 424.
1431d. at 417.
'441d. at 426.
145ld. at 428.
'46152 F.3d at 1146.
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ceived "hundreds" of complaints. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit concluded the
harm was sufficiently real. 147 Here, the district court's order for the prelimi-
nary injunction motion stated that canvassers occasionally broke out in
fights. 14 The S.O.C. Court may conclude that the frequency of harassment is
insufficient to pose real harm to justify the County's regulation.
Furthermore, the demand for news racks in the Resort District exceeded
supply and permits for renting the newsracks were by lottery, hence, it is more
cost effective to use canvassers to generate business for the plaintiffs. 49 The
S.O.C. Court could have found that the County has not "carefully calculated"
the costs and benefits associated with the burden on commercial speech im-
posed by the Ordinance as Discovery Network stipulated. 50 Therefore, the
means adopted is not a reasonable fit and burdens more than what is reasonably
necessary to regulate commercial speech.
Overall, the S.O. C. Court should have followed the Discovery Network ap-
proach of characterizing the Ordinance as commercial regulation yet finding
that it failed the Central Hudson test. The benefit of following the Discovery
Network holding is that the district courts and the government would have bet-
ter guidelines on how to review and regulate commercial speech. The S.O.C.
Court would not run afoul of the commercial speech doctrine and the govern-
ment cannot hide behind commercial speech to suppress the free flow of truth-
ful information related to legal commercial activities.
V. CONCLUSION
In this information age, commercial speech definitely occupies a signifi-
cant position in the scale of First Amendment values. From Christensen to
S. 0. C., the commercial speech has come full circle. Merchants using canvass-
ers to distribute advertising still argue its expression is not purely commercial
speech because it is inextricably intertwined with fully protected-speech and
should be treated as the latter. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court continues to
make a "common sense distinction" between commercial speech and fully pro-
tected-speech that the federal courts are left to disentangle.
So long as the Supreme Court mandates that commercial speech only en-
joys limited protection compared to other constitutional guaranteed speech, the
overbreadth doctrine should not be applied to commercial speech through the
overbroad reading of Riley. Certainty in the relationship between commercial
speech and the public forum doctrine undoubtedly will help the federal courts
and the government in regulating the economic behavior of businesses in the
public forum. Hopefully, some certainty on commercial speech doctrine will
14783 F.3d at 368 & n.1.
148See Order at 12.
1491d. at 13.
15'507 U.S. at 417.
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come out in the new millennium for the Ninth Circuit.
